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EVALUATING "COMPETENCY" CRITERIA: TOWARD A
UNIFORM STANDARD OF LAWYER
PERFORMANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, several prominent judges have complained that too many
lawyers are "incompetent."' Their complaints have prompted numer-
ous studies2 and polls3 to determine the nature and extent of lawyer
1. See, ag., Bazelon, 7he Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1973)
(many lawyers are "walking violations of the Sixth Amendment"); Burger, The Special Skills of
Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certfcation of Advocates Essential to Our System of Jus-
ice?, 42 FORHAM L. REV. 227, 237 (1973) (performance generally has not been adequate); Bur-
ger, Remarks on TrialAdvoacy: A Proposition, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 15, 16 (1967) (75-90% of cases
tried are not properly presented); Kaufman, The Court Needs a Friendin Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 175,
176 (1974) (the percent of cases suffering from "inadequate advocacy... is not insubstantial";
inadequacy stems from "lack of experience, lack of competence and lack of integrity"); Wolkin,
On Improving the Quality of Lawyering, 50 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 523, 524 n.6 (1976) (quoting Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger as saying that many young lawyers are "using the courts as a bush
league training camp"). But see Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompetence: Primun Non Nocere, 10
CREIGHTON L. REV. 613, 617 (1977) ("the charge of widespread incompetence is widely
disputed").
2. Professors Marks and Cathcart published one of the first studies in 1974. Marks & Cath-
cart, Discioline 9-ithin the Legal Professior=n Is It Sepf-Regulation, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193. The
authors interviewed "bar executives, bar counsel and disciplinary personnel in 17 jurisdictions," to
determine how effectively bar agencies deal with complaints of incompetence. Id at 196.
Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, on behalf of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit, insti-
gated the next major study. Judge Kaufman appointed Robert L. Clare chairman of the Advisory
Committee that conducted the research. Its findings are reported in Qualfcationsfor Practice
Before the United States Courts in the Second Circuit, Final Report of the Advisory Committee on
Proposed RulesforAdmission to Practice, 67 F.R.D. 159 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Clare Commit-
tee Report]. The Advisory Committee interviewed 40 judges in the Second Circuit and held hear-
ings in New York, Vermont and Connecticut. Clare, Incompetency andthe Responsibility of Courts
and Law Schools, 50 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 463, 467 (1976).
The Advocacy Committee of the General Practice section of the American Bar Association
sponsored another study. Its results are published in Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The
JudicialPerspective, 1978 A.B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 105. Its researchers sent questionnaires
about the quality of advocacy to all 5032 state judges and 483 federal judges sitting in trial courts
of general jurisdiction. Id at 109. The 1422 judges who completed the questionnaire represented
every state and the District of Columbia. Id at I 1l.
The Federal Judicial Center published the next major report. A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT,
THE QuALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE FEDERAL CounTS (1978). Chief Justice Burger's creation of
the Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States to Consider Standards for Admis-
sion to Practice in the Federal Courts in 1976 prompted the report. The committee, known by the
name of its chairman, Chief Judge Edward J. Devitt of the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota, designed a research program that the Federal Judicial Center then adminis-
tered. The Quality ofAdvocacy is the Federal Judicial Center's report of its findings to the Devitt
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"incompetency." Nevertheless, the legal profession has not yet agreed
upon uniform standards for judging lawyer competence.4 Existing
ABA standards,5 proposed reforms,6 and common-law decisions7 each
set forth different criteria for judging lawyer "competence." Moreover,
no existing "competence" standard is truly effective.8
To be effective, a standard of legal "competence" must satisfy two
prerequisites. First, it must address the major complaints found in the
recent barrage of criticisms of lawyer performance. 9 Otherwise, even
full compliance with the standard would not effectively restore respect
for the legal profession. The standard must also be reasonably easy to
apply. To meet this criterion, it must specifically state the precise du-
Committee. Id at xiii. The Judicial Center asked judges in district and circuit courts to evaluate
performances of lawyers who appeared before them, to answer questionnaires about the general
quality of advocacy, and to rate videotaped lawyer performances. Id at 1-3. The Judicial Center
also sent questionnaires to trial lawyers soliciting opinions about the quality of advocacy in fed-
eral courts. Id
Finally, in 1978, the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the ABA ap-
pointed a Task Force headed by Roger C. Cramton to study the relationship between legal educa-
tion and lawyer competence. Its findings are published in the ABA SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS (1979) [hereinafter cited as
CRAMTON REPORT].
3. The American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) surveyed judges in all the circuits except
the second and fifth concerning their opinions on lawyer incompetency. See Clare, supra note 2,
at 467-71.
The Illinois State Bar Association polled its members as to the "Reasons for 'A Less than Rea-
sonable Degree of Professional Skill and Care.'" Wolkin, supra note 1, at 528.
The Washington State Bar Association also surveyed its members to find the reasons for inade-
quate representation. See Otorowski, Some Fundamental Problemr with the Dewftt Committee Re-
port, 65 A.B.A.J. 713, 716 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note I, at 615. "It may be that good advocacy is in this sense like
hard core pornography ... you can know it when you see it without being able to define it." Id ;
Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qua4fied Counsel?, 61 A.B.A.J. 569 (1975). "The bar
has not met its duty to provide standards or guidelines for dealing with the lawyer who is incom-
petent." Id at 572. "Another crucial problem ... is the absence of workable criteria for judging
performance." Marks & Cathcart, supra note 2, at 236. "More definitive work must be performed
to arrive at a more tangible definition of'competence.'" Otorowski, supra note 3, at 717. "There
is no agreement among lawyers, consumers of legal services or scholars on what constitutes com-
petent performance, let alone the appropriate criteria for its measurement." Rosenthal, Evaluating
the Competence of Lawyers, 11 LAW & Soc'Y 257, 270 (1976).
5. See notes 52-60 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 98-154 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 61-97 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 52-154 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 26-46 infra and accompanying text.
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ties that a "competent" lawyer must fulfill' ° and the degree of care he
must exercise in fulfilling them." Furthermore, a workable compe-
tency standard must phrase its requirements in terms of actual per-
formance rather than innate ability, for it is easier to determine if a
lawyer actually did a certain act than to ascertain his capability to do
it.' 2 Effective "competence" criteria, then, require specific performance
standards based on the public expectations expressed in recent
criticisms.
Once effective legal performance standards are developed, their uni-
form application in all areas of law---civil 3 and criminal' 4 cases as well
as bar proceedings' 5-would facilitate improvement of the legal profes-
sion. Lawyers could ascertain their basic duties by referring to a simple
set of criteria.' 6 Judges and other reviewers could render more consis-
tent decisions and develop coherent precedent.' 7 As lawyers and re-
10. Before a reviewer can determine if a lawyer has fulfilled his duties, he must know what
those duties are. That determination might be quite difficulL For instance, it is now uncertain
whether a duty exists to inform a client of important developments in his case. Compare DR 6-
101 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (no explicit duty), infra note 52, with the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility § IA(a) (explicit duty), infra note 118. A list of spe-
cific duties, therefore, would simplify the reviewers task.
11. For instance, if there is a duty to "prepare," the reviewer still must decide how much
"preparation" is required--any degree of preparation, pefect preparation, reasonable prepara-
tion, etc. A clarified standard of care would simplify the determination of compliance with the
duty.
12. For example, a teacher only needs to read a pupil's answer sheet to decide if he answered
a question correctly. To decide if the pupil had the capability to answer correctly, however, re-
quires complicated tests to uncover any physical, intellectual, or emotional handicaps. The Cram-
ton Report states:
Too much of the discussion of the "problem of lawyer incompetence" has failed to
distinguish between competence and performance. Inadequate lawyerpesformance-the
failure to meet a satisfactory standard in some matter undertaken for a client-is not sy-
nonymous with lawyer incompetence. Competency properly refers to an individual's ca-
pacity to perform a particular task in an acceptable manner. A lawyer's actual
performance may fall short of the appropriate standard for any number of reasons unre-
lated to competence: inattention, laziness, the press of other work, economic factors or
mistake.
CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (emphasis added).
13. See notes 61-80 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 81-93 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 52-60, 122-40 infra and accompanying text.
16. "If attorneys are to act competently, they must know the standard by which their conduct
is to be measured." Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J.
47, 48 (1980).
17. Judges and other reviewers would all refer to and interpret the same written standards.
They could, therefore, use each other's opinions for guidance in deciding difficult interpretational
issues, without regard to jurisdictional barriers.
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viewers became more familiar with the standards, both voluntary
compliance and strict enforcement would increase, thereby improving
the quality of legal services.
To develop effective minimum legal performance standards, this
Note first distills the major reports, polls, and articles on lawyer "com-
petence"'" to identify the basic complaints against lawyers. 19 It then
evaluates existing and proposed "competence" standards to determine
whether they really address those complaints2" and whether they are
reasonably easy to apply.2 Based on those evaluations, it suggests a
new minimum legal performance standard22 and disposes of arguments
against use of a uniform standard.23 Finally, this Note proposes that
the ABA incorporate the standard into the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct24 and encourage its uniform use in all areas of law.25
II. THE "INCOMPETENCE" COMPLAINTS
Although the complaints against lawyers cannot be ranked in order
of importance," most of the complaints involve one of six basic per-
formance problems: (1) lack of preparation, (2) neglect of clients, (3)
inadequate attention to basic legal principles and rules, (4) inadequate
18. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text; notes 27-47 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 27-47 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 50-151 infra and accompanying text.
21. Id
22. See notes 155-75 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 189-95 infra and accompanying text.
24. See note 98 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 196-99 infra and accompanying text.
26. Each of the major studies records the answers to different questions and focuses on differ-
ent areas. Thus, a simple, numerical tabulation of results would be misleading. Marks & Cath-
cart, supra note 2, focuses on bar disciplinary actions. Its questions pertain mainly to such actions.
The committee designed the research reported in the Clare Committee Report, supra note 2, to
evaluate the need for a separate rule for admission to practice in the federal courts. The commit-
tee interviewed judges to determine the extent and nature of perceived inadequacies in trial advo-
cacy. Id at 161-66. Its report focuses on the lack of "training" displayed by trial lawyers. Id At
times the Report deliberately disregards two major areas of concern: "the experienced, well-
trained lawyer who, on occasion was unprepared, as well as the lawyer who lacked knowledge on
the subject matter involved in the particular suit, i.e., antitrust, patents, etc." Id at 164.
A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, supra note 2, focuses on judges' and lawyers' answers to these
four questions: What percent of the lawyer performances before the court are inadequate? Is
there, overall, a serious problem of inadequate advocacy in the federal courts? What is the most
frequent consequence of such inadequacy as exists? And, what is the most frequent cause of
inadequate advocacy? Id at 5-9. Thus, the report covers a wide range of topics.
The research in Maddi, supra note 2, also covers a broad range of topics. Researchers first
asked judges to list the factors they considered most important in determining trial advocacy com-
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analysis, (5) lack of skills, and (6) laziness.27
petence. Id at 124. Researchers then gave judges a list of 13 defects and asked them to identify
what percentage of incompetent lawyers exhibited those defects. Id at 126-27.
The Cramton Report, supra note 2, did not explain its method of determining criteria for com-
petence. Id at 8-10. It focused mainly on proposing means to reform legal education. Id at 11-
34.
The two state bar surveys, Wolkin, supra note 1, at 528 and Otorowski, supra note 2, at 715-16,
concentrate on the reasons for inadequate performance. The ACTL survey, however, records "the
percentage of incompetence, the age bracket, and the cause, and their suggestions for improve-
ment." Clare, supra note 2, at 467.
27. Maddi, supra note 2, breaks down its findings into very specific, often trial-oriented, cate-
gories. Nevertheless, most of the complaints reported can also be organized under the six problem
areas set forth in the text. The report contains two major compilations of data. The first includes
the judges' answers to an open-ended question about the factors determining competence. The
report concluded:
Judges' Response Regarding Factors That Determine Competence
Percent
Factors Percent Percent Listing
Mentioned Mentioning Factor First
(1) (2) (3)
Preparation 27 85 54
Experience and Training 23 70 24
Presentation 21 65 5
Personal 18 57 5
Intellectual 9 36 9
Miscellaneous 2 9 2
Total 100 99
Id. at 124 (footnote omitted). Professor Maddi grouped the 6,244 factors mentioned by respon-
dents into the following six categories:
The combinedpreparation category includes responses coded in the following catego-
ries: preparation, organization, knowledge of facts of case, knowledge of law applicable
to case, and knowledge of alternatives to sentencing. Id at 124 n.40 (emphasis added).
The combined experience and training category includes responses coded in the follow-
ing categories: education or training, experience, general knowledge of law, and knowl-
edge of rules. Id at 124 n.41 (emphasis added).
The combined presentation category includes responses coded in the following catego-
ries: presentation of case, argumentation, brevity, communication or oral skills (unspeci-
fied), general courtroom acuity, and client control. Id at 124 n.42 (emphasis added).
The combined personal category includes responses coded in the following categories:
diligence, courtroom etiquette, ethical behavior, personality, physical appearance, and
punctuality. Id. at 124 n.43 (emphasis added).
The combined intellectual category includes responses coded in the following categories:
analytical ability, ability to isolate real issues, intelligence, writing skills, and objectivity.
Id at 124 n.44 (emphasis added).
Obviously, the factors under the first category, "preparation", would fall into the preparation
area. Of the responses in the "experience and training category", "general knowledge of law, and
knowledge of rules" would fall into the similarly denominated area. Since "education or training"
and "experience" are not elements of performance, they do not fit directly into any of the perform-
ance areas. But they are probably manifested as a lack of skill, and thus would fall into that area.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Most judges and lawyers identify lack of preparation as the preemi-
The factors included in the "presentation" category are also types of skills. Within the "personal"
category, the "laziness" category covers lack of "diligence" and "punctuality." In the "personal"
category, "courtroom etiquette" would fit under the "rules" section.
The rest of the category, which involves judgment about ethical behavior, personality, and
physical appearance, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. Evaluations of personality and
appearance are so subjective that they are inappropriate for inclusion in a minimum performance
standard. And, "whatever difficulties we may have in agreeing about what a competent (i.e.,
skilled, effective) lawyer is are as nothing compared with disputes about what ethical behavior is."
Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 259.
In the "intellectual" category, "analytical ability" and "ability to isolate real issues" fall within
the "inadequate analysis" problem area. "Writing skills" are a form of "skills." Evaluating "ob-
jectivity" and innate "intelligence" is beyond the scope of this Note.
Thus, all of the major performance factors listed by the judges as affecting competence fall
within the six major problem areas described above. The six problem areas also encompass most
of the 13 "forms of incompetence" rated in the report's second data compilation. Judges esti-
mated what percent of incompetent lawyers displayed each form of incompetence, and the mean
results were:
Mean Percent
Forms of Incompetence of Attorneys Exhibiting
1. Inadequate preparation 68.7
2. Inadequate knowledge of rules of evidence 58.1
3. Inadequate ability to conduct a proper cross- 57.7
examination
4. Inadequate analytical ability in the framing of the 57.0
issues
5. Inadequate ability to frame objectives properly 54.1
6. Inadequate knowledge of the rules of procedure 53.3
7. Inadequate knowledge of substantive law 52.7
8. Inadequate ability to present expert testimony 48.2
9. Inadequate ability to argue before a jury 47.3
10. Inadequate ability in handling and presentation of 45.6
documents and letters
11. Inadequate utilization of technical or expert 45.0
supportive services
12. Inadequate understanding of basic courtroom 40.9
etiquette
13. Inadequate awareness of the fundamental ethics of 33.2
the legal profession
Id at 126-27.
These 13 forms of incompetence can be grouped under the six problem areas as follows:
Number 1, "preparation," correlates to the "preparation" area. Numbers 2, 6, 7, and 12 fall
within the area of "inadequate attention to basic legal principles and rules." Numbers 3, 8, 9, 10,
and 11 involve the lack of various "skills." Numbers 4 and 5 involve "inadequate analysis." Only
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number 13, "ethics," is not covered. Determinations of what constitutes ethical behavior are be-
yond the scope of this Note. The Clare Committee Report, supra note 2, found that criticisms of
lawyers fall into five basic categories:
1) the lawyer lacks basic knowledge concerning the trial of cases;
2) the lawyer has accepted a matter beyond his training;
3) the lawyer appears unprepared;
4) the lawyer intentionally and habitually fails to obey court orders and rules;
5) the lawyer fails to observe rules of courtroom courtesy and decorum.
id at 176.
Again, each of the categories of criticisms is within one of the six areas described above. Num-
bers one and two are manifested as a "lack of skill" and thus fall into that area. Number three is
obviously part of the "inadequate preparation" area. Numbers four and five are examples of
"inadequate attention to basic legal principles and rules." Thus, the findings of the Clare Commit-
tee Report fit within the six major problem areas.
The findings of Marks & Cathcart, supra note 2, fall within the "client neglect" category. Their
findings indicate that the vast majority of complaints to disciplinary agencies are of "neglect." Id
at 210-13.
The criticisms found in A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, supra note 2, also fit into the six-area
framework. The majority of district court judges and lawyers interviewed indicated that "lack of
specialized trial skills or knowledge," and "failure . . . to prepare cases to the best of [one's]
ability" are the most frequent causes of inadequate performance. Id at 6. Those complaints fall
within the "lack of skills" and "inadequate preparation" areas. The appellate judges listed as
causes of inadequate advocacy: "failure by lawers to research their cases and prepare themselves
to the best of their ability" ("lack of preparation"), "lack of the basic analytical ability, knowledge,
or judgment needed to be an adequate lawyer" ("inadequate analysis" and "inadequate knowl-
edge of basic legal principles"), and "lack of the special skills, knowledge or judgment needed to
be an adequate appellate lawyer" ("lack of skill," "inadequate knowledge" and "inadequate anal-
ysis"). Id at 8.
District court judges and lawyers listed the following areas as those most in need of improve-
ment: "proficiency in the planning and management of litigation" ("skill" and "analysis"); "tech-
nique in examining witnesses" ("skill"); "and general legal knowledge" ("knowledge of basic legal
principles"). Id at 6. Each area, as noted in the parentheses, matches one of the six problem
areas listed above.
Appellate judges found these areas to be most in need of improvement: "ability to set forth
facts and issues in briefs in a comprehensible manner" ("skills" and "analysis"); "judgment in
deciding what points to focus on in briefing" ("analysis"); "skill in making distinctive use of oral
argument" ("skill"); "mastery of the law important to the particular case, and mastery of the
record below" ("preparation"). Id at 8. Thus, the complaints compiled by A. PARTRIDGE & G.
BERMANT, supra note 2, also fit within the six general areas.
The Cramton Report, supra note 2, organizes the components of "competence" into three major
parts. The major parts, as well as most of their subparts, are also within the six general areas listed
above. The first part is "Certain Fundamental Skills," which include analysis of problems ("anal-
ysis"); legal research ("preparation"); collecting and sorting facts ("preparation"); writing effec-
tively ("skills"); communicating orally with effectiveness ("skilW'); interviewing, counseling and
negotiating ("skills'); and organizing and managing legal work ("skills"). Id at 9-10. The second
part is entitled "Knowledge about Law and Legal Institutions." It requires knowledge of relevant
law and procedures ("knowledge of basic legal principles and rules"). Id at 10. The third part
involves "Ability and Motivation". Id at 10. Although "ability" is not apes formance area, "mo-
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nent cause of poor legal performance.2" Critics allege that many law-
yers fail to do even the most basic legal research.29 They also complain
that lawyers have inadequate knowledge of the facts of their cases and
of the law specifically applicable to those facts.30
Client complaints to disciplinary agencies most frequently allege
"neglect. 31 It is difficult to identify the underlying cause of the allega-
tions because disciplinary agencies rarely record the type of "neglect"
complained of by clients.32 Researchers have found, however, that the
major cause of "neglect" complaints is lawyers' failure to inform their
clients of case developments and lawyers' repeated refusals to answer
requests for such information.33
Critics also allege a variety of forms of "inadequate attention to basic
legal principles and rules."34 Trial judges state that a high percentage
of lawyers disregard the rules of evidence,35 the rules of procedure,36
tivation" does fall within the "laziness" category. Most of the factors of competence listed in the
Crampton Report, therefore, are part of the six problem areas.
The complaints revealed by surveys also fit within the six categories. The Washington State Bar
Association survey lists "inadequate grasp of the facts of the case," "poor knowledge of law of the
case," "inadequate preparation," and "laziness" as significant factors. Otorowski, supra note 3, at
716-17. All of those criticisms clearly fall within the six general areas. The Illinois Bar Associa-
tion survey cited "Inadequate preparation," "Lack of experience," "General lack of ability or
training," "Failure to keep abreast of specialty areas," and "Lack of formal training in an area of
law" as signficant reasons for inadequacy. Wolkin, supra note 1, at 528. Obviously, the first
reason is within the "preparation" category. Each of the other reasons, except "lack of ability," is
manifested as a "lack of skill" and thus falls under that area.
The ACTL survey exposes complaints of inadequate preparation ("preparation") and insuffi-
cient training ("skills"). Clare, supra note 2, at 469.
28. See A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, supra note 2, at 6, 8; CRAMTON REPORT, supra note
2, at 9; Maddi, supra note 2, at 124, 126-27; Clare, supra note 2, at 469; Otorowski, supra note 3, at
716; Clare Committee Report, supra note 2, at 172; Wolkin, supra note 1, at 528.
29. See Burger, supra note 1 at 237 (lawyers have not read case files); Middleton, Judges
Object to Lawyers' Courtroom Behavior, 66 A.B.A.J. 834, 835 (1980) (same).
30. A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, supra note 2, at 8; CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 2, at 9;
Maddi, supra note 2, at 124 n.40; Otorowski, supra note 3, at 716.
31. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 2, at 210-14. Of 996 complaints to the New York Bar
disciplinary agency in one year, 524 alleged "neglect." The next highest categories were "other"
with 80 and "Actions in bad faith-Abuse of process" with 41. Id In Minnesota in the year
examined, 50 percent of the complaints concerned "neglect." Id at 212 n.44.
32. Id at 209-10.
33. Id at 210.
34. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
35. Questionnaires compiled in Maddi, supra note 2, indicate that a mean of 58.1% of "in-
competent" lawyers have "inadequate knowledge of the rules of evidence." Id at 126. See Bur-
ger, supra note 1, at 234-35 (1973) (majority of lawyers do not know the rules of evidence and do
not ask questions in conformity with them).
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and principles of general substantive law. 7 Many judges, likewise,
complain of annoying breaches of local rules of court.38
The last three areas-inadequate analysis, lack of skills, and lazi-
ness-are also major performance problems. Judges observe frequent
failures to identify the major issues in a case. 39 They criticize lawyers'
lack of skill in examination of witnesses,40 use of expert testimony,
4
'
use of objections, 42 and presentation of oral argument43 and evidence.'
Finally, commentators condemn attorney laziness, describing lawyers
36. Judges in one investigation found that about 53.3% of "incompetent" lawyers had an
inadequate knowledge of the rules of procedure. Maddi, supra note 2, at 126. See Kaufman,
supra note 1, at 176.
37. Maddi, supra note 2, at 26, reports that judges found a mean of 52.7% of "incompetent"
lawyers had inadequate knowledge of substantive law. In A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, supra
note 2, at 6, district court judges list general legal knowledge as an area most in need of improve-
ment. The Cramon Report, lists knowledge of general law as a major part of "competence."
CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
38. The Clare Committee Report, supra note 2, at 176, reports that intentional and habitual
failure "to obey court orders and rules" is one of five major complaints. Judge Kaufman com-
plains of constant violation of court rules concerning length and deadlines for briefs. Kaufman,
upra note I, at 176.
39. Maddi, supra note 2, reports that judges found a mean of 57.0% of "incompetent" lawyers
displayed inadequate analytical ability in the framing of issues, and a mean of 54.1% displayed
inadequate ability to frame objectives properly. Id at 127. In A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT,
supra note 2, appellate judges list "lack of... basic analytical ability" as a cause of inadequate
advocacy. Id at 8. They also find need for improvement in the "ability to set forth the important
facts and issues in briefs in a comprehensible manner" and 'Judgment in deciding what to focus
on in briefing." Id at 8.
40. In Maddi, supra note 2, judges report a mean of 57.7% of "incompetent" lawyers demon-
strate inadequate ability to conduct a proper cross-examination. Id at 127. District court judges
in A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, supra note 2, list "technique in examining witnesses" as an area
in most need of improvement. Id at 6. Chief Justice Burger remarked in a speech that "[ilt is a
rare law graduate, for example, who knows how to ask questions.., in order to develop facts in
evidence." Keynote Address of Warren E. Burger, Annual Conference of Phi Alpha Delta Frater-
nity, Mayflower Hotel, August 28, 1968, (quoted in Littlejohn, Ensuring Lawyer Competency: The
South Carolina Approach, 64 JuD. 109, 109 n.l (1980)).
41. Maddi, supra note 2, reports that judges found a mean of 48.2% of "incompetent" attor-
neys had inadequate ability to present expert testimony, and a mean of 45.0% displayed inade-
quate utilization of technical or expert supportive services. Id at 127.
42. See Burger, The Special Skills ofAdocacy, supra note 1, at 235 (lawyers waste time
making wooden objections in inappropriate matters).
43. Maddi, supra note 2, states that judges found a mean of 47.3% of "incompetent" attorneys
displayed inadequate ability to argue before ajury. Id at 127. In A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERmANT,
supra note 2, appellate judges report that "skill in making distinctive use of oral arguments" is
lacking. Id at 8.
44. Maddi, supra note 2, reports that judges found a mean of 45.6% of "incompetent" attor-
neys showed inadequate ability in handling and presentation of documents and letters. Id at 127.
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who repeatedly miss court dates,45 fail to Shepardize, 46 and shorten
their arguments to avoid parking tickets.47
Thus, critics consider each of the six basic defects-lack of prepara-
tion, neglect of clients, inadequate attention to basic legal principles
and rules, inadequate analysis, lack of skills, and laziness-a major
source of concern.
III. THE EXISTING STANDARDS
Currently, the legal profession uses three basic "compentence" stan-
dards: Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)41 of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, 49 the common law of legal malpractice, 50 and the con-
stitutional law interpreting the sixth amendment's guarantee of "effec-
tive" counsel.51 The standards differ greatly in their concern with the
foregoing six performance complaints and in their ease of application.
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 6-101(A) 52 addresses two of the major com-
plaints, but contains serious deficiencies. Subsection (A)(2) covers
45. One lawyer missed 51 of 55 scheduled court appearances and then quit when the client
refused to plead guilty. Another lawyer eventually obtained an acquittal for the client. Bazelon,
supra note 1, at 2 (quoting N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1973, at 1, col. 6).
Lawyers' failures to appear in court are apparently not infrequent. See Middleton, supra note
29, at 835.
46. One lawyer explained to a judge that he could only cite one 1895 case as support for his
argument because he did not have a Shepard's citator. Bazelon, supra note 1, at 3.
47. Id
48. See notes 52-60 infra and accompanying text.
49. In 1969, the Code of Professional Responsibility replaced the Canons of Professional
Ethics, promulgated in 1908 as the guide to acceptable lawyer conduct. A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS
IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 28-29 (1976). The Code has been officially adopted, with vary-
ing amendments, by the courts or legislatures of every state and the District of Columbia. Id at
29.
The Code of Professional Responsibility has three parts: Disciplinary Rules (DR's) setting
"minimum standards" for lawyer conduct, Ethical Considerations (EC's) providing "aspirational"
guides, and Canons serving as "axiomatic norms." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
iTy [hereinafter cited as CODE], Preliminary Statement, reprinted in A. KAUFMAN, supra, at 626.
50. See notes 61-80 infra and accompanying text.
51. See notes 81-132 infra and accompanying text.
52. DR 6-101(A) states:
Failing to Act Competently
(A) A lawyer shall not
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not compe-
tent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to
handle it
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
CODE, supra note 49, reprinted in A. KAuFmAN, supra note 49, at 668.
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preparation complaints by forbidding the handling of a legal matter
"without preparation adequate in the circumstances." 53  Subsection
(A)(3) deals with neglect complaints by prohibiting the neglect of a "le-
gal matter. '54 It is unclear, however, whether the DR answers the
other complaints. The DR's other subsection, (A)(1), states that "[a]
lawyer shall not. . . [h]andle a legal matter which he knows or should
know that he is not competent to handle. . .. "55 "Competence" may
or may not include attention to legal principles and rules, thorough
analysis, skill, and diligence.
That same lack of clarity makes the DR extremely difficult to apply.
Beyond preparation, it does not specify a lawyer's duties;56 duties to
"be competent" and "not neglect" are too general to be useful. Addi-
tionally, the DR fails to delineate the degree of care required in fulfil-
ling duties. It does mandate preparation "adequate in the
circumstances, ' 57 but it does not specify how much preparation is "ade-
quate." Furthermore, DR 6-101(A)(1) seems to demand difficult judg-
ments of innate ability. It proscribes the handling of a matter by a
lawyer who "knows or should know that he is not competent" to han-
dle it, 8 thus focusing on awareness of ability and not quality of per-
formance. Taken literally, it requires a reviewer to ask not whether a
lawyer performed "competently," but whether he was capable of per-
forming "competently."5 9 Although accompanying ethical considera-
tions negate that implication somewhat, 60  the wording remains
53. Id
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id
59. Use of the word "competent" often implies an ability judgment. "Competency properly
refers to an individual's capacity to perform a particular task in an acceptable manner." CRAM-
TON REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (emphasis added). Incompetence is "a general inability to adhere
to even minimal standards of professionalism." Note, The Illinois Legal Malpractice Tort: Basic
Tenets and Recent Trends, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 427, 437 n.69. But see Wolkin, supra note 1, at 528
(as used by proponents of continuing legal education, "incompetence" means "lack of the knowl-
edge necessary").
60. EC 6-1 states that a lawyer "should accept employment only in matters in which he is or
intends to become competent to handle," CODE, supra note 49, EC 6-1 (emphasis added), thus
implying that "competence" is not a fixed, innate ability but something that can be achieved. EC
6-2 also speaks of "attaining and maintaining... competence." Id EC 6-2. The EC's are merely
"aspirational"; they are not legally binding on attorneys. See note 49 supra.
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confusing. The ABA Code's standard, thus, presents many application
difficulties.
Legal malpractice standards are in some ways easier to apply than
the Code's standards. First, they do provide a standard of care, though
courts phrase it in various ways. Most 61 require exercise of the degree
of care used by a "reasonable" 62 or "ordinary" 63 attorney in "similar
circumstances"'6 or in the "same locality." 65 Courts also generally
phrase malpractice standards in terms of performance, asking if a law-
yer actually exercised the requisite care. 66 Furthermore, they do articu-
late some attorney duties. Although most cases discuss only the duties
directly at issue,6 7 rather than listing all responsibilities, those most fre-
quently cited include "skill,"' 68 "knowledge, ' 69 "care,"' 70 and
61. A minority of courts requires only that an attorney "[do] the best he can," Hill v. Mynatt,
59 S.W. 163, 166 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900), or "[act] to the best of his knowledge," National Say.
Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1879).
62. See, e.g., Smitherman v. Superior Court, 5 Ariz. App. 170, 174, 424 P.2d 461, 465, va-
cated, 102 Ariz. 504, 433 P.2d 634 (1967); Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 82, 378 S.W.2d 655, 661
(1964); Smiley v. Manchester Ins. Indem. Co., 71 Ill. 2d 306, 313, 375 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1978);
House v. Maddox, 46 IML App. 3d 68, 71, 360 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1977); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d
106, 112 (Iowa 1975); Grago v. Robertson, 49 A.D.2d 645, 646, 370 N.Y.S.2d 255, 258 (1975);
Glenn v. Haynes, 191 Va. 574, 481, 66 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1951); Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Claus-
ing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968).
63. See, e.g., Leighton v. New York Susquehanna & W. R.R., 303 F. Supp. 599, 618
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aft'd, 455 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972); Wright v. Wil-
liams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1975); Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App.
849, 851, 227 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1976); Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 475 (1934); Gabbert v.
Evans, 184 Mo. App. 283, 293, 166 S.W. 635, 638 (1914).
The standard seems to equate ordinary conduct with competent conduct. For example, since
lawyers "ordinarily" do not understand the rule against perpetuities, misusing the rule is not neg-
ligence. Lucas v. Harm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591-92, 364 P.2d 685, 689-90, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825-26
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). See Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 265.
64. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvTr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 113, at 165 (1977).
65. See, e.g., Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975); Ramp v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972); Watkins v. Sheppard, 278 So.2d
890 (La. Ct. App. 1973). "The standard of care to be applied to an attorney... is the care, skill
and diligence exercised by attorneys practicing in his community or locality." Id at 892 (emphasis
added). Illinois still at least nominally adheres to the locality rule. See Note, supra note 59, at
431.
66. See, e.g., Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 438 P.2d 865 (1968).
"mhe correct standard to which the plaintiff is held in theperformance of his professional services
is that degree of care ... commonly exercised by a reasonable ... lawyer." Id at 395, 438 P.2d
at 867 (emphasis added). But cf. Hill v. Mynatt, 59 S.W. 163, 166 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900) (calling
for ability assessments).
67. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 64, at § 113.
68. See, eg., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591-92, 364 P.2d 685, 689-90, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
825-26 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13
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"diligence."'"
Because malpractice standards include those duties, the standards
obviously address some of the complaints discussed in Part II. The
"skill" and "diligence" requirements directly correlate to major com-
plaints,72 and "knowledge," as applied, covers "inadequate attention to
basic legal principles and rules."73 It is unclear, however, whether legal
malpractice standards answer the other criticisms. A landmark Cali-
fornia decision recognized a duty to do "reasonable research,"74 but
other states have not yet adopted such a clear duty to prepare.7 5 Courts
also have not yet decided whether attorneys, like doctors, have a duty
to advise clients of important decisions involving their cases.76 Lack of
Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1961); Watklns v. Sheppard, 278 So.2d 890, 892 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Glenn v.
Haynes, 191 Va. 574, 581, 66 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1951).
One commentator asserts, however, that only a small percentage of malpractice complaints al-
lege a lack of "technical proficiency." Frankel, supra note 1, at 619.
69. See, e.g., Lucas v. Harm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591-92, 364 P.2d 685, 689-90, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
825-26 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d
393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968); Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 584, 328 P.2d 164, 167
(1958).
Courts often require only the most basic knowledge. See, e.g., Citizens Loan, Fund & Say.
Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 146, 23 N.E. 1075, 1075 (1890) ("those rules and principles of law
that are well established and clearly defined in the elementary books, or which have been declared
in adjudged cases that have been duly reported, and published a sufficient length of time to have
become known"); Gimbel v. Waldman, 193 Misc. 758, 761, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888, 892 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
("law ... so well and clearly defined, so firmly imbedded in our legal jurisprudence as to be
beyond any point of question").
70. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sheppard, 278 So. 2d 890, 892 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Hodges v. Carter,
239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954); Glenn v. Haynes, 191 Va. 574, 581, 66 S.E.2d 509,
513 (1951).
71. See, ag., Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1961);
Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954); Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Claus-
in8, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968).
72. See notes 27, 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 35-38, 69 supra and accompanying text.
74. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), overruedon other
grounds, In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal 3d 838, 851, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641
(1976).
[E]ven with respect to an unsettled area of law, we believe an attorney assumes an obli-
gation to his client to undertake reasonable research in an effort to ascertain relevant
legal principles and to make an informed decision as to a course of conduct based upon
an intelligent assessment of the problem.
Id at 359, 530 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
75. See Note, A Modern Approach to the LegalMalpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689, 706 (1977).
76. See Schnidman, The Collateral Effects of Legal Specialization On the Applicable Standard
of Care As It Relates to a Duty to Consult and a Duty to Advise, 6 Oiito N.U.L. Rnv. 666, 676
(1979).
The question of whether an attorney is under a duty to advise a client of every action he
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communication is the basis of client neglect complaints;77 because the
legal malpractice standards currently fail to require communication,
they do not definitively address those complaints. Likewise, they gen-
erally do not speak to "inadequate analysis" criticisms.7" Only a few of
the basic complaints identified in Part II, therefore, are consistently
considered in legal malpractice actions.
Courts also dismiss many malpractice suits without even considering
the scope of an attorney's duty of care. A client must show that his
attorney's acts or omissions caused palpable harm in order to win a
judgment.7 9 It is so difficult to prove that "but for" attorney perform-
ance a client would have won his case that many cases are dismissed on
the causation issue, 0 leaving the duty question unsettled.
A similar problem hampers development of sixth amendment "effec-
tive counsel" standards. Under the sixth amendment," if a criminal
defendant shows that his representation was not "effective," he receives
a new trial.82 Most courts, however, grant new trials only if the defend-
ant demonstrates that the lawyer's performance actually prejudiced the
defendant's chances of leniency or acquittal.8 3 Thus, many courts
takes in handling the client's case remains unanswered. Yet there is no uncertainty at all
that physicians may be held liable for failing to advise a patient of a risk common to a
medical procedure.
Id
77. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text.
79. Note, supra note 59.
[P]laintiff must prove four elements to establish a prima facie case: that an attorney-
client relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant; that the attorney deviated
from the standard of care owed to his client; that this alleged departure from the applica-
ble standard of care constituted the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury
and that as a result of this injury, the plaintiff suffered actual damages.
Id at 430. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 30 (4th ed. 1971); Note, The
Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice Cases, 63 CORNELL L. REy. 666, 667-68
(1978); Note, supra note 75, at 692.
80. See Note, supra note 75, at 689; Note, supra note 59, at 430.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
82. Eg., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942); Wilson v. Phend, 417 F.2d 1197,
1200 (7th Cir. 1969); Goodson v. Peyton, 351 F.2d 905, 907-08 (4th Cir. 1965); Joseph v. United
States, 321 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 977 (1964).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal,
J.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); id at 226 (Mac Kinnon, J.); Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d
1214, 1221-22 (5th Cir. 1979), vacatedas moot, 446 U.S. 903 (1980); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d
1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Ritch, 583
F.2d 1179, 1183 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Beran v. United States, 580 F.2d 324,
[Vol. 59:1019
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/15
Number 3] LAWYER COMPETENCY CRITERIA 1033
never fully consider questions of degrees of care and kinds of duties.
When courts do reach standard of care questions, most now formu-
late an objective standard 4 that eases application. Most of the stan-
dards are phrased in terms of actual performance 5 and require the
level of care ordinarily expected of attorneys generally 6 or of "reason-
able" attorneys87 in similar circumstances. The standards, however,
327 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. Cooper, 580 F.2d 259, 263
n.8 (7th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); People v. Pope, 23 CaL 3d 412, 425, 590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr.
732, 739 (1979).
Only mistakes that might affect the verdict's accuracy cause reversal. See, e.g., De Kaplany v.
Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1976) (failure to raise diminished capacity defense), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1075 (1977); Trombley v. Anderson, 439 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (failure to raise
insanity defense); Gray v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (failure to raise statu-
tory inapplicability); United States exrel Mitchell v. LaValee, 417 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd,
551 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976) (failure to introduce exculpatory evidence).
The prejudice requirement, however, is not uniformly applied. See United States v. Decoster,
624 F.2d 196, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Robinson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944
(1979); id at 275 (Bazelon, J., dissenting); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1334 (9th Cir.
1978) (en banc) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[d]efendants... denied their Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of reasonably competent counsel at trial should be entitled to
relief without a showing of prejudice"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); Moore v. United States,
432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc) ("[t]he ultimate issue is not whether a defendant was
prejudiced by his counsel's act or omission, but whether counsel's performance was at the level of
normal competency").
Some courts decide on a case-by-case basis whether prejudice must be shown. See, e.g., Davis
v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214, 1223 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[jln each case we must assess the advisability of
requiring a showing of prejudice"), vacated as moot, 446 U.S. 903 (1980); United States ex rel.
Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970) (requiring proof of prejudice if counsel's
error is "with respect to a narrow issue," but reversing automatically if the errors "have. . . so
pervasive an effect on the process of guilt determination that it is impossible to determine accu-
rately the presence or absence of prejudice").
84. See notes 86-90 infra and accompanying text.
85. E.g., they ask if "the lawyer'sperformance was so ineffective that it was tantamount to a
denial of [the defendant's] constitutional right." United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 231
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (MacKinnon, J., concurring) (emphasis added), cert denied, 444 U.S.
944 (1979).
86. See, e.g., id at 206 (Leventhal, J.) ("behavior of counsel [and] falling measurably below
that which might be expected an ordinary, fallible lawyer"); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d
1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978) ("within the range of competence expected of attorneys in criminal
cases"); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 1977) (within "the range of competence
expected of attorneys in criminal cases"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) ("the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which
normally prevails at the time and place").
87. See, e.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (en banc) ("the skill, judgment and
diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980); Cooper
v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) ("reasonably effective and competent
defense representation"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881,
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vary considerably from court to court, and the United States Supreme
Court has so far refused to settle the conflicts.88 A few courts continue
to use a subjective test, overturning a case only if it "shocks the con-
science" and "makes a mockery of justice."8 9 The trend, however, is
clearly toward the objective standards of care.90
887 (5th Cir.) ("reasonably likely to render and did render reasonably effective counsel"), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) ("the cus-
tomary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar
circumstances"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 844 (1977); United States v. Toney, 527 F.2d 716, 720 (6th
Cir. 1975) ("reasonably likely to render and does render reasonably effective assistance"), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976).
88. The Supreme Court has defined ineffectiveness of counsel in a few narrow areas. See,
e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (representation of clients with conflicting inter-
ests); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (denial of right to consult with attorney during
trial recess).
The Court, however, has never defined effective representation in the context of lawyer "compe-
tence." In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), for instance, the parties principally argued
the adequacy of the defense presented. The defendant met his attorney "for the first time en route
to the courtroom on the morning of the trial." Id at 55 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
Nevertheless, the sixth amendment claim was "all but ignored by the Court majority which af-
firmed the conviction." Bazelon, supra note 1, at 21. Similarly, in McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970), the Court left the job of delineating minimum performance standards to the
lower courts. Id at 770-71. See Note, A FunctionalAnasis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 1053, 1057-58 (1980).
In Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978), Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
strongly dissented from the denial of certiorari:
Despite the clear significance of this question, the Federal Courts of Appeals are in dis-
array ....
[.I]t is this Court's responsibility to determine what level of competence satisfies the
constitutional imperative .... [We should attempt to eliminate disparities in the mini-
mum quality of representation required to be provided to indigent defendants.
Id at 1011-13.
89. In the federal courts, only the Second Circuit still applies the "farce and mockery" test.
United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d Cir. 1974). It has indicated that it may
switch to an objective standard in the future. See, e.g., Indiviglio v. United States, 612 F.2d 624,
629 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 933 (1980); Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 66 (2d
Cir. 1976). Some state courts, however, continue to apply it. See, eg., Deason v. State, 263 Ark.
56, 60-61, 562 S.W.2d 79, 82 (1978); People v. Elder, 73 Il1. App. 3d 192, 199-200, 391 N.E.2d 403,
408-09 (1979); Nickell v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1978); People v. De Graf-
fenreid, 19 Mich. App. 702,717, 173 N.W.2d 317, 325 (1969); Turnbough v. State, 574 S.W.2d 400,
402-03 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
90. Eight circuits have switched from the "farce and mockery" test in the last 13 years. Dyer
v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980); Cooper v. Fitzharris,
586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Bosch,
584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1974); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974);
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Unfortunately, there is no similar trend toward specification of du-
ties.9' Hence, ineffective assistance of counsel standards remain vague.
Some courts do mention "skill," "judgment," or "diligence,"92 but
many use terms such as "reasonably competent and effective represen-
tation. '93 The vagueness of the latter impairs application and makes it
difficult to determine whether the standard answers the competency
complaints previously discussed.
Each of the three current "competence" standards-DR 6-101(A),
the common law of legal malpractice, and "effective counsel" interpre-
tations-has serious deficiencies. None addresses all the basic com-
plaints against the legal profession.94 Each presents application
difficulties: unclear standards of care,95 uncertain duties,96 or taxing
"capability" requirements. 97 All are unsuitable for use as a uniform
minimum legal performance standard.
IV. THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
Bar organizations recently have made three proposals that contain
"competence" standards: the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,98
the ABA's proposed substitute for its Code of Professional Responsibil-
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970) (en bane); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d
113 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
91. One recent circuit court opinion explicitly rejected the idea of using a "checklist" of re-
sponsibilities. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 944 (1979).
92. See, ag., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (en banc) ("skill, judgment, dili-
gence"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir.
1976) ("skills and diligence"), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977).
93. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 974
(1979).
94. See notes 52-55, 72-78, 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 57, 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
98. The discussion draft of the Model Rules was published January 30, 1980. The commis-
sion solicited opinions on the Rules and held four public hearings: in Chicago, February 3, 1980;
in Atlanta, March 3, 1980, in San Francisco, April 7, 1980; and in New York City, May 5, 1980.
The commission originally planned to submit a final version of the Rules to the House of Dele-
gates in February, 1981, but extended that deadline to allow further comment. ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Introductory Letter (Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter
cited as RULES].
The American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, chaired
by Robert J. Kutak, compiled the draft.
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ity;99 the Model Peer Review System, an ABA project'0° proposing the
creation of an informal, remedial review system to supplement existing
disciplinary methods; °1 and the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct,
the American College of Trial Lawyers' (ACTL) proposed alternative
to the Code of Professional Responsibility. 0 2 The proposed standards
are all more effective than existing ones. Though their criteria differ
significantly, they are more responsive to criticisms and easier to apply
than their current counterparts.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) address all of the
basic client complaints. Section 1.1 requires "specific legal knowledge,
skill, efficiency, thoroughness and preparation."10 3 Obviously, it covers
lack of skills"' and "inadequate preparation"'0 5 complaints. The sec-
tion's comments also indicate that "skill" includes "analysis,"' 06
thereby dealing with another complaint. 0 7 "Specific legal
knowledge '  seems to entail "inadequate attention to basic legal prin-
ciples and rules."'0 9 Section 1.4 speaks to client "neglect.""1i 0 It creates
99. For a discussion of the current Code of Professional Responsibility, see notes 49 & 52-60
supra and accompanying text.
100. The American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Pro-
fessional Education prepared the discussion draft. ALI-ABA, A MODEL PEER REVIEW SYSTEM ix
(1980) [hereinafter cited as PEER REVIEW].
101. The system has four components. Part I proposes model criteria for evaluating attorney
competence.
Part II describes a program of "referral peer review." Through that program, third parties can
refer lawyers to review authorities, who determine whether the lawyer needs assistance to meet the
standards of competence. If the authorities find a need for assistance, they request that the attor-
ney participate in a "voluntary program of remedial training."
Part III, disciplinary peer review, sets forth a program for disciplining lawyers who threaten
harm to present or future clients.
Part IV, law practice peer review, outlines a program for reviewing and upgrading law prac-
tices. It involves self-referral by individual lawyers or whole firms. Id at I.
102. ACTL, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, Preface (Discussion Draft 1980)
[hereinafter cited as CODE OF CONDUCT], reprinted in TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 44-63. The preface
states that "[t]he legal profession cannot continue to function ... under disciplinary rules and
ethical considerations [found in the Code of Professional Responsibility] that are, even as the
ABA has acknowledged, incoherent, inconsistent, and unconstitutional" and that "the Model
Rules make few improvements over the CPR [Code of Professional Responsibility]. ... Id,
reprinted in TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 47.
103. RULES, supra note 98, § 1.1, at 7.
104. See notes 27, 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
106. Comments to § 1.1, RULES, supra note 98, § 1.1, at 8.
107. See notes 27, 39 supra and accompanying text.
108. RULES, supra note 98, § 1.1, at 7.
109. See notes 27, 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
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a detailed duty to keep the client informed that includes "periodically
advising" clients of the "status and progress" of their assignment,"1
"explaining the significant legal and practical aspects" of the prob-
lem" and "foreseeable effects of alternative courses of action," and
"promptly complying with reasonable requests about the matter."'"13
Finally, sections 1.2 and 1.5 address the "laziness" problem 1 4 by re-
quiring lawyers to "attend promptly to matters undertaken," to give
them "adequate attention until completed," ' 1 5 and to "act diligently in
representing a client.""' 6
In addressing these complaints, the drafters made the Rules easier to
apply by clearly specifying a lawyer's basic duties. In other ways, how-
ever, the Rules present application difficulties. Section 1.1 provides
that a lawyer shall "undertake representation" only if he "can act with
adequate competence.""' 7 Technically, therefore, to find a violation of
section 1.1 a judge must decide not only if a lawyer did act "compe-
tently," but also if he could act competently. As previously mentioned,
ability assessments are quite difficult. 118 The section's standard of care
also presents problems. It requires the care employed in "acceptable
practice,"' 19 but it does not reveal to whom or by what standard a law-
yer's performance must be "acceptable." Furthermore, the other sec-
tions furnishing "competence" criteria"' provide no standard of care at
all.' 2 1 In terms of application ease, therefore, the Rules are ineffective.
The strengths and weaknesses of the standards in the second new
proposal, the Model Peer Review System (Peer Review), 122 are similar
to those of the Rules. The Peer Review's criteria, like those of the
Rules, respond to the criticisms discussed. In section 1, the Review
states that a "competent" attorney "is specifically knowledgeable about
fields of law in which he or she practices, .. performs the techniques
110. See notes 27, 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
111. RULES, supra note 98, § 1.4(1), at 12.
112. Id § 1.4(2), at 12.
113. Id § 1.4(3), at 12.
114. See notes 27, 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
115. RULES, supra note 98, § 1.2, at 10.
116. Id § 1.5, at 15.
117. Id § 1.1, at 6 (emphasis added).
118. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
119. RULES, supra note 98, § 1.1, at 7.
120. Id §§ 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, at 7, 10, 12, 15.
121. Id
122. See notes 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
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of such practice with skill, . . . [and] properly prepares and carries
through. . ". ." ' Thus it addresses complaints of "inadequate atten-
tion to basic legal principles and rules,"' 24 "lack of skill," 125 and "lack
of preparation."'' 26  The requirement to "properly . . . carry
through' 27 also deals with "laziness complaints."' 28  Section 3 ad-
dresses the "inadequate analysis" problem 29 by requiring that lawyers
identify "material factual and legal issues" and "alternative responses
to the problem."' 30 Furthermore, sections 4 and 6 deal with neglect of
clients by requiring lawyers to collaborate with clients in developing
strategy' 3' and to advise them of "the completion of actions, of delays,
or of circumstances requiring reassessment" and of "relevant changes
in the law."' 32 The competence criteria of the Model Peer Review Sys-
tem, therefore, address all six major complaints against lawyers. 33
The criteria admit to ease of application in some respects. Like the
standards in the Rules, they specify a lawyer's duties in addressing
those complaints.134 Moreover, the criteria seeking to remedy the main
problem areas' 35 are performance, not ability, requirements; lawyers
not only must be able to prepare, but they must prepare "properly."136
Nevertheless, the criteria present two application difficulties. First,
they do not provide a standard of care. Section 1 states that "[1]egal
incompetence is measured by the extent to which an attorney fails to
maintain" '' 37 certain qualities, but it does not specify what "extent" of
maintenance is necessary to achieve minimum competence.' 38 Further-
more, the performance requirements described above are mingled with
123. PEER REviEw, supra note 100, § 1, at 11.
124. See notes 27, 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 27, 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
127. PEER REviEW, supra note 100, § 1, at 11.
128. See notes 27, 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 27, 38 supra and accompanying text.
130. PEER REviEW, supra note 100, § 3, at 16.
131. Id § 4, at 17, 20.
132. Id at 20.
133. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
134. They create duties to be "specifically knowledgeable about fields of law," to use "skill,"
to "prepare," to "carry through," to identify issues, and to advise clients of developments. See
notes 122-32 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
136. PEER REviEW, supra note 100, § 1, at 11.
137. Id
138. Id
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such "ability" requirements, as being "intellectually . . .capable," 139
and with aspirational goals, such as "achiev[ing] rapport with those
who participate in the client's matter.' The mixture of ability re-
quirements, aspirational goals, and performance standards makes iden-
tification, and thus application, of the Peer Review's standards more
difficult.
Like the Rules and the Peer Review System, the American Lawyer's
Code of Conduct (Code of Conduct) addresses most of the complaints
considered in Part II. In doing so, however, it articulates some of a
lawyer's duties with more specificity than do the other standards,
thereby increasing ease of application. For instance, rather than
merely requiring "preparation,"' 41 it commands lawyers to "seek out
all facts and legal authorities that are reasonably available and relevant
to a client's interests."' 42 It also clarifies treatment of the "laziness"
problems, 43 mandating that attorneys "take such legal action as is nec-
essary and reasonably available to protect. . . a client's interests."'"
It includes "attention to basic legal principles and rules"'145 by stating
that "[a] lawyer shall give due regard not only to established rules of
law, but also to legal concepts that are developing and that might affect
a client's interests.''46
Some of its duties, however, are less specific. Its requirement that
lawyers must keep clients informed, 14 for instance, is not as detailed as
that of the Rules.' 4 The Code of Conduct also does not explicitly ad-
dress the problem of inadequate analysis 149 or expand on the duty of
skill. 150 Nevertheless, in most areas its detail is helpful.
The Code of Conduct's "competence" standard is also easy to apply
for two other reasons. First, its sections are definitely phrased as per-
139. Id
140. Id § 5, at 19.
141. RULES, supra note 98, § 1.1, at 7.
142. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 102, § 4.3, at 55.
143. See notes 27, 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
144. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 102, § 4.2, at 55.
145. See notes 35-38, 69, 73 supra and accompanying text.
146. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 102, § 4.4, at 55. It is unclear, however, whether "rules of
law" include procedural as well as substantive rules.
147. Id § 4.5, at 55. Section 4.5 states that "[a] lawyer shall keep a client apprised of all
significant developments ... unless the client has instructed the lawyer to do otherwise." Id
148. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
149. See CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 102, § 4, at 55.
150. Id
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formance requirements, alleviating the need for difficult capability as-
sessments. 151 In addition, it clearly states a standard of care: "At a
minimum, a lawyer shall serve a client with skill and care commensu-
rate with that generally afforded to clients by other lawyers in similar
matters." 152 The phrase "generally afforded," however, may cause
problems. If it means "average," then the half of the legal profession
that is necessarily "below average" violates the standard. 153 If it means
"customary," courts may find, as they have in certain industries, that
"customary" practice may still be unreasonable" and thus unaccept-
able. 54 The Code of Conduct's standard does, however, provide at
least some standard of care.
The proposed "competence" standards, on the whole, are clearly su-
perior to existing standards in most areas. Each, however, has certain
weaknesses. An effective uniform standard would embody the best as-
pects of each set of competence criteria.
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Standard
By combining parts of the various existing and proposed competence
standards, one can assemble a standard that definitively addresses the
major criticisms of lawyers 55 and assiduously avoids the application
problems discussed above.156 In addressing those criticisms, a perform-
ance standard should state a lawyer's duties as specifically as possible
to make application easier. The first complaint is "lack of prepara-
tion,"157 and the Code of Conduct's formulation of the preparation re-
quirement is the most specific. It requires, in one section, that a lawyer
151. Each section begins "A Lawyer shall" and requires a specific action. See CODE OF CON-
DUCT, supra note 102.
152. Id § 4.1, at 55.
153. One court, in a medical malpractice case, recognized that an "average' standard would
"put the jury in a predicament as to how to arrive at an 'average'. . .[and] automatically make
... approximately one-half of the doctors guilty of malpractice." Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark.
776, 770, 531 S.W.2d 945, 950 (1976). See also Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417
(1889); Purfield v. Kathrane, 73 Misc. 2d 194, 341 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1973).
154. See Marietta v. Cliffs Ridge, Inc., 20 Mich. App. 449, 174 N.W.2d 164 (1970); Shafer v.
H.B. Thomas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 19, 146 A.2d 483, (1958); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Like,
381 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1963). See also Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure
of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. Rv. 281, 301 (1979).
155. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
156. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
157. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
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"seek out all facts and legal authorities that are reasonably available
and relevant '158 and, in another section, that he seek out "reasonably
available resources."' 5 9 Together the two sections cover most aspects
of preparation, and the "reasonably available and relevant" '16 caveat
may assuage fears of judicial abuse.
"Neglect of clients" is best addressed by the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Their requirement is more detailed than the Code of
Conduct's command to "keep a client apprised."16' The Rules' stan-
dard requires a lawyer to "periodically" inform his client of his case's
"status and progress," explain significant legal points and "the foresee-
able effects of alternative action," and to "promptly [comply] with rea-
sonable requests for information."' 162 Thus, the standard directly
answers complaints that lawyers leave clients uniformed and refuse to
answer requests for information. 63 It also ensures that consumers of
legal services, like medical patients, 164will be aware of significant deci-
sions affecting their lives. Unlike the Peer Review System's criteria,
however, it does not generally require client collaboration in strat-
egy.' 65 Because a lawyer must make many "strategy" decisions that
cannot involve collaboration with the client due to time and legal com-
plexity, the Rules' more narrow requirement to inform clients of fore-
seeable effects of courses of action' 66 is easier to apply.
The Code of Conduct's standard is the most detailed with regard to
"inadequate attention to basic legal principles and rules."'167 It com-
mands a lawyer to "give due regard not only to establishing rules of
law, but also to legal concepts that are developing,"'' 68 making it clear
that lawyers are required to keep "current." The section should in-
clude "legal rules" as well as "principles," however, in order to fully
answer the complaints discussed above. 169
The Peer Review System contains the only "analysis" duty. It re-
158. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 102, § 4.3, at 55.
159. Id § 4.6, at 55.
160. Id § 4.3, at 55.
161. Id § 4.5, at 55.
162. RULES, supra note 98, § 1.4, at 12.
163. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
164. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 131, 162 supra and accompanying text.
166. See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 27, 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
168. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 102, § 4.4, at 55.
169. See notes 35-36, 146 supra and accompanying text.
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quires lawyers to identify "material and factual legal issues" and "al-
ternative responses to the problem."' 170 It would be difficult to
formulate a more specific standard.
Similarly, the minimum performance standard should not dissect
into components the requirement of the exercise of "skill."'' Other-
wise, it may become too narrow to be applied to all types of lakvyers.172
An effective standard simply calls for the exercise of "skill."
"Laziness" problems, however, can be addressed with more specific-
ity than a mere requirement of "diligence." 173 The Code of Conduct
requires a lawyer to "take such legal action as is necessary and reason-
ably available to protect. . . a client's interests."' 174 That formulation
clearly covers sins of sloth such as failure to appear in court, to make
timely motions, or to Shepardize.175
The foregoing duty formulations are each specific enough to be
workable and are phrased in terms of actual performance. An effective
standard, however, also needs a clear standard of care. In this context,
the "reasonable attorney" standard used in many malpractice cases 176
is the easiest to apply. Courts and reviewers could easily confuse stan-
dards requiring the care exercised by the "ordinary attorney"'177 or that
"generally afforded" by "other lawyers"' 7 1 with "average" conduct. If
"competent" means "average," then all "below average" attorneys are
"incompetent."'179 Furthermore, "ordinary" conduct should not neces-
sarily be equated with "competent" conduct. The pervasiveness of per-
formance problems may make some serious and intolerable conduct
ordinary.180 The "reasonable attorney" standard provides an objective
standard of care without presenting those problems.
The combination of the "reasonable attorney" standard with the
170. PEER REVIEW, supra note 100, § 3, at 16.
171. See notes 27, 40-44 upra and accompanying text.
172. Trial lawyers, for instance, need specific skills in use of expert testimony and presentation
of evidence. See notes 41, 44 supra and accompanying text. It would be unreasonable, however,
to require a lawyer who only drafts wills to have those skills.
173. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
174. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 102, § 4.2, at 55.
175. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
176. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
177. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
178. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
180. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
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above specific performance duties creates a very effective minimum
performance standard.
B. Uniformity
The minimum performance standard described above should be uni-
formly applied in all areas of law. Currently, so many different duties
and standards of care exist'81 that a lawyer cannot be certain of his
obligations. Specific, uniform requirements would encourage volun-
tary compliance with "competence" standards.'82 Uniformity would
also promote consistent decisions in two areas drastically in need of
clarity and consistency-malpractice and "effective counsel" cases.' 3
The arguments in favor of a uniform standard, therefore, are strong.
Commentators propound several major arguments against use of a
single "competence" standard in all areas of law, but the arguments fail
under close analysis. The first argument is that application of perform-
ance standards strict enough to eliminate the problems perceived in the
legal profession would cause undue civil liability 8 4 and an unreasona-
ble number of criminal case reversals.' 8 5 Malpractice cases, however,
require a showing of causation and harm'8 6 as well as breach of duty,
and sixth amendment cases generally require a similar showing of
"prejudice."' 7 Assuming enforcement of those requirements, 188 viola-
181. See notes 52-154 supra and accompanying text.
182. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 72-88 supra and accompanying text.
184. See Wofram, supra note 154, at 296-97; Commentary, Violation of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility as Stating a Cause ofAction in Legal Malpractice, 6 OHIo N.L. REv. 666, 700
(1979).
185. One judge estimated that if every substandard performance by a criminal defense attor-
ney caused reversal, his court would retry half of its criminal cases. Bazelon, supra note I, at 22-
23.
186. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
187. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
188. Currently the "prejudice" requirement is not uniformly applied. See United States v.
Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Robinson, T., concurring), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 944 (1979). See also note 83 supra. Some commentators argue that courts should elimi-
nate the requirement in order to increase pressure for better lawyer performance. Note, supra
note 88, at 1073 n.139. See also Note, Inefective.4Asistance of Counsel- The Lingering Debate, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 659 (1980). Automatic referral of ineffective counsel complaints to bar discipli-
nary agencies, however, also increases pressure, and it does so at less expense.
Courts, therefore, should apply the prejudice requirement and use other tactics, such as in-
creased referrals, to encourage high standards. One survey found that of the 18% of all judges
who had ever instituted formal attorney disciplinary proceedings, 55% had done so only once, 25%
twice, and 8% three times. Maddi, supra note 2, at 129-30. Other researchers discovered a similar
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tions of the standards that do not harm clients would not cause liability
or reversals.1 8 9 When violations do cause harm, the critics surely are
not asserting that the harm should remain unredressed simply to avoid
costs to attorneys and courts. Therefore, uniform minimum perform-
ance standards would not create undue liability or unreasonable
reversals.
Moreover, they would not hamper the effectiveness of a peer review
system. One could argue that standards minimal enough to be used in
all settings would, if enforced in a peer review system, impair efforts to
make good lawyers excellent ones."9 Acceptance of a minimum stan-
dard does not, however, preclude development of a whole spectrum of
higher standards. Reviewers could use a uniform minimum perform-
ance standard in peer review when dealing with lawyers concerned
only with meeting minimum requirements. 191 It would be irrelevant,
but not detrimental, in working with those desiring excellence.
Another potential problem with uniform standards is illusory. Com-
mentators assert that with identical bar and malpractice standards a
finding of substandard performance in one arena might bind subse-
quent proceedings in another. 192 They argue that such issue preclusion
might make disciplinary agencies even more hesitant to find viola-
tions. 193 The organized bar should, however, attack problems of pro-
tectionism rather than cater to them. If disciplinary agencies and
courts are applying the same standards, prior agency findings of Code
violations should be conclusive in courts. Lawyers in disciplinary pro-
ceedings are afforded full trial safeguards1 94 plus the benefit of a
reluctance to refer. See Marks & Cathcart, supra note 2, at 205; REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COM-
MITrEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION ON CANONS OF ETHICS (1958). "IT]he prevailing
attitudes of lawyers toward disciplinary enforcements ranges from apathy to outright hostility."
Id at 1.
189. See notes 79, 83 supra and accompanying text.
190. Many of the lawyers participating in peer review are expected to "already be more than
adequately competent." PEER RnvInw, supra note 100, at 1. If the review system's only standards
are minimum ones, the review will be valueless.
191. Part II of the Model Peer Review System provides for third party referral of lawyers
needing assistance to meet minimum requirements. PEER REVIEW, supra note 100, at 33. Some of
those referred may be concerned only with satisfying those requirements.
192. See Wolfram, supra note 154, at 297, 298 n.69; Commentary, supra note 184, at 700.
193. Wolfram, supra note 154, at 297; Commentary, supra note 184, at 701.
194. See Wolfram, supra note 154, at 298 n.72. "Most jurisdictions ... accord the accused
attorney full procedural protections such as counsel, cross-examination, discovery, and subpoena
powers." Id
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stricter standard of proof. 195 Courts should not waste valuable time on
issues previously fairly tried. Similarly, court findings of substandard
performance should preclude a lawyer's colleagues from declaring that
his conduct is acceptable to the bar. Issue preclusion is simply not a
legitimate reason to oppose uniform standards.
None of the major arguments against uniform standards withstands
close analysis. The reasons in favor of uniformity are strong. There-
fore, the legal profession should apply a uniform minimum legal per-
formance standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the ABA finalizes its Rules of Professional Conduct, 196 it
should include the following rule:
Competence
(1) At a minimum, a lawyer shall serve a client with skill and care
commensurate with that afforded by reasonable attorneys in similar
matters.
(2) A lawyer shall seek out all facts, legal authorities, and resources
that are reasonably available and relevant to a client's interests in the
matter entrusted to the lawyer by the client.
(3) A lawyer shall keep a client informed about matters in which
the lawyer's services are being rendered. Informing the client includes:
(a) periodically advising the client of the status and progress of the
matter;
(b) explaining the significant legal and practical aspects of the matter
and the foreseeable effects of alternative courses of action; and
(c) promptly complying with reasonable requests for information
about the matter.
(4) A lawyer shall give due regard not only to established legal
195. Id at 292 n.49. "While the typical civil suit burden of proof is a preponderance of the
evidence, in attorney disciplinary proceedings the widely employed burden of proof is the stricter
clear and convincing evidence standard." Id See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFES-
SIONAL DISCIPLINE, SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 15 n.12 (1975).
Some states do, however, use the "preponderance of the evidence" test in disciplinary proceedings.
See, e.g., In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1978); In re Crane, 400 Mich. 484, 255 N.W.2d 624
(1977).
196. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
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principles and rules, but also to legal concepts that are developing and
that might affect a client's interests.
(5) A lawyer shall formulate the material legal and factual issues
and identify alternative legal responses to the problem.
(6) A lawyer shall take such legal action as is necessary and reason-
ably available to protect a client's interests.
If the ABA adopted the above rule and endorsed its use as a uniform
minimum performance standard, it would greatly clarify the duties and
obligations of attorneys.'97 That clarification would aid judges and
other reviewers in uniformly enforcing performance standards. 9 8 Uni-
form enforcement would, in turn, help cure the perceived problems of
the legal profession, 199 resulting in greater integrity and a better reputa-
tion for the profession. Therefore, the ABA should adopt this proposal
and encourage its uniform application.
Nancy A. Strehlow
197. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
198. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
199. See notes 27-47 supra and accompanying text.
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